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Upaniṣads · Sarasvatīrahasya 4.23
॥
Devanāgarī
भेदस्तयोर्विकारः स्यात्सर्गे न ब्रह्मणि क्वचित् । अस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्यंशपञ्चकम्
Transliteración (IAST)
bhedastayorvikāraḥ syātsarge na brahmaṇi kvacit | asti bhāti priyaṃ rūpaṃ nāma cetyaṃśapañcakam
Palabra por palabra
SánscritoIASTSignificado
भेदः तयोः विकारः स्यात्bhedaḥ tayoḥ vikāraḥ syāttheir difference is modification
सर्गे न ब्रह्मणि क्वचित्sarge na brahmaṇi kvacitin creation, never in brahman
अस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपंasti bhāti priyaṃ rūpaṃ"is," "shines," "pleasant," "form"
नाम च इति अंश-पञ्चकम्nāma ca iti aṃśa-pañcakamand "name" — thus the fivefold portion
Traducción
Their difference is modification — [it occurs] in creation, never in brahman. "Is," "shines," "pleasant," "form," and "name" — thus the fivefold portion.
Versión
97a1ed47d950 · publicado 12 ago 2026, 5:00:00 UTC
Disponible enRUENPasa de verso en verso con
A teaching is introduced that is among the finest in this school: aṃśa-pañcaka, "the fivefold portion." In every thing, five are distinguished: asti ("is"), bhāti ("shines, appears"), priyam ("pleasant"), rūpa ("form"), and nāma ("name"). The next verse will say that the first three belong to brahman, and the last two to the world.
This construction, to my mind, is excellent, and it is worth voicing. Take any thing — a pot. It is; it appears to consciousness; it is pleasant (or needed); it has a form and a name.
The first three can be said of it, and of anything else at all: everything that is, is; everything that appears, appears; everything needed, is needed. But the form and the name are only its own. That is, in the pot there is more that is common than particular: three of the five portions are not its own property.
The Vaiṣṇava side accepts this teaching and finds it useful; the dispute begins only at the conclusion the next verse will draw. Let us add here only what is worth noting in the third portion. Priyam, "the pleasant," is named as belonging to brahman on a par with being and appearing; that is, pleasantness is declared a property of the highest, not of our taste.
This position suits her well, and that the Taittirīya says raso vai saḥ, "He is taste" (2.7), was discussed when reading the Jābāla-darśana (6.48).