Upaniṣads · Pañcabrahma 31
॥
Devanāgarī
सर्वं कार्ष्णायसं ज्ञातं तदभिन्नं स्वभावतः । कारणाभिन्नरूपेण कार्यं कारणमेव हि
Transliteración (IAST)
sarvaṃ kārṣṇāyasaṃ jñātaṃ tadabhinnaṃ svabhāvataḥ | kāraṇābhinnarūpeṇa kāryaṃ kāraṇameva hi
Palabra por palabra
SánscritoIASTSignificado
सर्वं कार्ष्णायसं ज्ञातंsarvaṃ kārṣṇāyasaṃ jñātaṃeverything made of black iron is known
तत् अ-भिन्नं स्व-भावतःtat a-bhinnaṃ sva-bhāvataḥit is not different by nature
कारण-अ-भिन्न-रूपेणkāraṇa-a-bhinna-rūpeṇain a form not different from the cause
कार्यं कारणम् एव हिkāryaṃ kāraṇam eva hithe effect is indeed the cause
Traducción
"Everything made of black iron is known; it is not different by nature. In a form not different from the cause, the effect is indeed the cause."
Versión
fc4ca481281c · publicado 12 ago 2026, 5:00:00 UTC
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The position called in Vedānta sat-kārya-vāda is set out: "the effect is the cause." It is worth noting the qualification standing in the very line and usually omitted: kāraṇa-abhinna-rūpeṇa, "in a form not different from the cause." That is, it says not "the effect is the cause," but "the effect is the cause in the respect in which it is not different from it."
This qualification settles everything, and it is worth voicing. The pot is clay by substance and is not clay by form, by purpose, and by name. The first is what this line asserts; the second it does not deny, but simply does not speak of.
The Vaiṣṇava side builds her teaching on precisely this qualification, called viśiṣṭa-advaita, "non-duality of the distinguished," or, in Caitanya, acintya-bheda-abheda. Its definition is this: one in essence, different in form; and both assertions are true, for they are taken in different respects. Let us add what Rāmānuja says of this and what is worth knowing, for this is his chief move.
He says: the effect relates to the cause as śarīra to śarīrin, "body to the embodied." A body is the body of the one within it; it is inseparable from him, held by him, serves him — and yet is not him. He calls this relation apṛthak-siddhi, "non-separate actuality": what does not exist separately, but exists distinctly.
This concept, to my mind, is the most precise thing devised in this whole dispute; and it explains both clay and pot, and soul and God, without canceling either of the two.