Upaniṣads · Rudrahṛdaya 34
॥
Devanāgarī
सत्यवद्भाति तत्सर्वं रज्जुसर्पवदास्थितम् । तदेतदक्षरं सत्यं तद्विज्ञाय विमुच्यते
Transliteración (IAST)
satyavadbhāti tatsarvaṃ rajjusarpavadāsthitam | tadetadakṣaraṃ satyaṃ tadvijñāya vimucyate
Palabra por palabra
SánscritoIASTSignificado
सत्य-वत् भाति तत् सर्वंsatya-vat bhāti tat sarvaṃtrue it seems, all that
रज्जु-सर्प-वत् आस्थितम्rajju-sarpa-vat āsthitamhaving stood, like a snake in a rope
तत् एतत् अ-क्षरं सत्यंtat etat a-kṣaraṃ satyaṃthat indeed is the Imperishable, the truth
तत् विज्ञाय विमुच्यतेtat vijñāya vimucyatehaving known that, one is liberated
Traducción
"All that seems true, having stood, like a snake in a rope; that indeed is the Imperishable, the truth — having known that, one is liberated."
Versión
51ea611af386 · publicado 12 ago 2026, 5:00:00 UTC
Disponible enRUENPasa de verso en verso con
Again the rope and the snake; this likeness was discussed when reading the Kāṭharudra (13), and three objections to it were given there. Let us add here one, relevant to the present verse and, to my mind, decisive. It is said: everything seems true — satyavad bhāti, "shines as if true." And immediately: tad etad akṣaraṃ satyaṃ, "that indeed is the Imperishable, the truth."
That is, in one line the word "truth" is used twice, and in two different senses: the world seems true, and the truth is Him. And this must be noted, for a good half of the dispute rests on this ambiguity. The word satya in these books does not mean "truth" as opposed to falsehood, but "what truly exists, what does not cease to be." In this sense the world indeed is not satya: it exists, but does not abide.
The difference between "the world does not exist" and "the world does not abide" is enormous, though the words used are the same. The Vaiṣṇava side says the second and never the first: the world is real, for it was created by the Real, but it is temporary; and hence one cannot rely on it, but there is no need to despise it either. Read this way, the likeness too becomes more bearable. A rope taken for a snake truly exists; but there is no snake. So too here: what exists, exists; but what it seems to us — solid, our own, and eternal — does not.