उपनिषद् · Pañcabrahma 29
॥
देवनागरी
एकेनैव तु पिण्डेन मृत्तिकायाश्च गौतम । विज्ञातं मृण्मयं सर्वं मृदभिन्नं हि कायकम्
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
ekenaiva tu piṇḍena mṛttikāyāśca gautama | vijñātaṃ mṛṇmayaṃ sarvaṃ mṛdabhinnaṃ hi kāyakam
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
एकेन एव तु पिण्डेनekena eva tu piṇḍenaby one lump alone
मृत्तिकायाः च गौतमmṛttikāyāḥ ca gautamaof clay, O Gautama
विज्ञातं मृत्-मयं सर्वंvijñātaṃ mṛt-mayaṃ sarvaṃeverything made of clay is known
मृत् अ-भिन्नं हि कायकम्mṛt a-bhinnaṃ hi kāyakamfor the product is not different from the clay
अनुवाद
"By one lump of clay alone, O Gautama, everything made of clay is known, for the product is not different from the clay."
संस्करण
7d9c1cec02cd · प्रकाशित 12 अग॰ 2026, 5:00:00 am UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
The first of the Chāndogya's three comparisons is cited, and it is the chief basis for the non-dual reading; it must be examined with the utmost care. Here is the original: yathā saumyaikena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syād vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttiketi eva satyam, "as, dear one, by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known — the modification is a verbal handle, a name; 'clay' alone is what is true" (Chāndogya 6.1.4). Let us examine the decisive words.
Vācārambhaṇam is interpreted two ways: "having its support in speech" or "originating from speech." Vikāra — "modification," that is, the pot. Nāmadheya — "designation, name."
The non-dual reading: the pot is only a name; only the clay is real; hence the world is only a name, and only brahman is real. The Vaiṣṇava reading — Rāmānuja's — rests on what is said further in the same text, and it is worth setting out. It says mṛttiketi eva satyam, "'clay' alone is what is true." Not "the pot does not exist," but — true is that it is clay.
That is, what is denied is not the pot's existence but its independence: the pot is not a separate substance apart from the clay. The very example gives the argument for this reading. If the pot were entirely unreal, one could not drink from it; but one drinks from it, and a lump of clay will not serve for that.
Hence the distinction does work — and what does work is not a mere name. Let us add a second argument, from the promise itself. It is promised that, knowing clay, you know everything made of clay. If the clay-made did not exist at all, the promise would be empty: there would be nothing to know.