उपनिषद् · Pañcabrahma 33
॥
देवनागरी
भेदः सर्वत्र मिथ्यैव धर्मादेरनिरूपणात् । अतश्च कारणं नित्यमेकमेवाद्वयं खलु
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
bhedaḥ sarvatra mithyaiva dharmāderanirūpaṇāt | ataśca kāraṇaṃ nityamekamevādvayaṃ khalu
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
भेदः सर्वत्र मिथ्या एवbhedaḥ sarvatra mithyā evadifference is everywhere false
धर्म-आदेः अ-निरूपणात्dharma-ādeḥ a-nirūpaṇātbecause a property and the rest cannot be determined
अतः च कारणं नित्यम्ataḥ ca kāraṇaṃ nityamand therefore the cause is eternal
एकम् एव अ-द्वयं खलुekam eva a-dvayaṃ khaluone alone, non-dual
अनुवाद
"Difference is everywhere false, because a property and the rest cannot be determined; and therefore the cause is eternal, one alone, non-dual."
संस्करण
1451cad75038 · प्रकाशित 12 अग॰ 2026, 5:00:00 am UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
An argument is given, and it is the very one by which the non-dual side proves the falsity of difference: dharma-āder anirūpaṇāt, "because a property and the rest cannot be determined." This argument is worth setting out, for it is subtle. The question is asked: what is difference? Is it a property of a thing, or the thing itself?
If a property, it requires a bearer, and one must then ask how the bearer differs from the property; and this is again a difference, and so on without end. If the thing itself, then in naming the thing we have already named the difference, and to say "this thing is different from that" is an empty repetition. Both paths lead to a dead end; hence, it is concluded, difference cannot be determined, and what cannot be determined is unreal.
Rāmānuja's answer to this argument is, to my mind, the strongest point in his whole polemic, and it is worth citing. He says: difference is neither a property nor a separate thing; it is svarūpa-bheda, "the difference of the very essence," that is, the very determinacy of a thing as this one and not another. And he adds an argument from perception, which is decisive.
The opposing side asserts that there occurs nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa, "perception without differentiation": the first instant of sight, when one sees something without yet having identified it. Rāmānuja answers: no such perception occurs. Even the first instant of sight is sight of something: not "in general," but of this very patch, this very shape. Perception with no determinacy at all would not differ from non-perception.
The consequence is this: difference is given in experience itself, not attributed to it by the mind; and so it cannot be canceled by reasoning, for every act of reasoning rests on experience.