उपनिषद् · Varāha 2.81
॥
देवनागरी
निश्चेष्टो निर्विकारश्च लयो जीवति योगिनाम् । उच्छिन्नसर्वसङ्कल्पो निःशेषाशेषचेष्टितः । स्वावगम्यो लयः कोऽपि मनसां वागगोचरः
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
niśceṣṭo nirvikāraśca layo jīvati yoginām | ucchinnasarvasaṅkalpo niḥśeṣāśeṣaceṣṭitaḥ | svāvagamyo layaḥ ko'pi manasāṃ vāgagocaraḥ
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
निश्चेष्टः निर्विकारः चniśceṣṭaḥ nirvikāraḥ camotionless and unchanging
लयः जीवति योगिनाम्layaḥ jīvati yogināmdissolution lives among yogis
उच्छिन्न-सर्व-सङ्कल्पःucchinna-sarva-saṅkalpaḥwith all intentions cut off
स्व-अवगम्यः लयः कः अपिsva-avagamyaḥ layaḥ kaḥ apia certain dissolution, known only to oneself
मनसां वाक्-अगोचरःmanasāṃ vāk-agocaraḥinaccessible to mind and speech
अनुवाद
"Motionless and unchanging dissolution lives among yogis; with all intentions cut off, having stopped all movement without remainder, — a certain dissolution, known only to oneself, inaccessible to mind and speech."
संस्करण
05427407e32d · प्रकाशित 12 अग॰ 2026, 5:00:00 am UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
Worth noting is the word sva-avagamya, "known only to oneself." That is, this state is acknowledged incommunicable: it cannot be described, and every description will miss it. This acknowledgment occurs in such books and deserves respect: not every teaching dares say there is nothing to say about the main thing.
Let us add, however, what deserves saying of such an acknowledgment, for it is two-sided. On one hand, it is honest: the object truly may lie beyond words, discussed when reading the Ganapati (7.2). On the other, it removes the teaching from verification: what is known only to oneself can be neither confirmed nor disputed.
The Vaishnava side holds against this a rule discussed more than once: signs must be visible from outside. Its signs — tears, a trembling voice, the inability to continue, a diminishing pull toward everything else — are things open to observation; discussed when reading the Jabala-darshana (5.11). Let us add what it says of ineffability, and which softens the contradiction.
It acknowledges that the object is ineffable; but insists that the relation to it is speakable. Of Him one cannot say; of what happens to a person, one can — and its whole literature is occupied with the second. Hence its books are full of descriptions of states and sparing of definitions; and this, in my view, is the right allotment.