उपनिषद् · Jābāladarśana 2.6
॥
देवनागरी
ब्रह्मादिलोकपर्यन्ताद्विरक्त्या यल्लभेत्प्रियम् । सर्वत्र विगतस्नेहः संतोषं परमं विदुः । श्रौते स्मार्ते च विश्वासो यत्तदास्तिक्यमुच्यते
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
brahmādilokaparyantādviraktyā yallabhetpriyam | sarvatra vigatasnehaḥ saṃtoṣaṃ paramaṃ viduḥ | śraute smārte ca viśvāso yattadāstikyamucyate
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
ब्रह्म-आदि-लोक-पर्यन्तात्brahma-ādi-loka-paryantātup to and including the world of Brahma
विरक्त्या यत् लभेत् प्रियम्viraktyā yat labhet priyamwhat dearness he obtains by dispassion
सर्वत्र विगत-स्नेहःsarvatra vigata-snehaḥeverywhere free of attachment
संतोषं परमं विदुःsaṃtoṣaṃ paramaṃ viduḥthey know as the highest contentment
श्रौते स्मार्ते च विश्वासःśraute smārte ca viśvāsaḥtrust in shruti and smriti
अनुवाद
"That dearness which he obtains by dispassion — up to and including the world of Brahma — everywhere free of attachment: that they know as the highest contentment. Trust in shruti and smriti is called faith in being."
संस्करण
ccbb6049b842 · प्रकाशित 12 अग॰ 2026, 5:00:00 am UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
Contentment is raised to its ground: the highest contentment is dispassion reaching up to the world of Brahma. The phrase brahma-adi-loka-paryantat, "up to and including the world of Brahma," is, in Indian books, a way of saying "all the way to the top." The world of Brahma is the highest attainable; and a dispassion that reaches even it means: not to desire even the best of all that exists.
This is worth comparing to a famous passage of the Bhagavatam, for there the same thing is said, and said through persons. Nrisimha offers the boy Prahlada any boon, and he answers: "I am no merchant, to serve for wages... but if You must give — give me, that no desires whatever be in my heart" (7.10.4, 7.9.24–25).
This answer contains something not present in the line here, and it deserves naming. Prahlada refuses not worlds in general, but in the presence of the very One who offers them; and his refusal is not dispassion, but preference. The difference between the two kinds of dispassion deserves stating, for outwardly they are alike. One refuses because he wants nothing; another because he wants something else. The first is achieved by drying up desire; the second comes of itself, once something better has appeared.
The second half of the line defines astikya, "faith," as vishvasa, "trust," in shruti ("what is heard," that is, the Veda) and smriti ("what is remembered," that is, tradition). Worth noting is the word vishvasa itself: it means not "opinion" and not "conviction of truth," but precisely trust, the thing that exists between people. Faith here is defined not as the mind's assent to a proposition, but as a relation to the one who spoke.