उपनिषद् · Jābāladarśana 10.4
॥
देवनागरी
तथा भ्रान्तैर्द्विधा प्रोक्तो ह्यात्मा जीवेश्वरात्मना । नाहं देहो न च प्राणो नेन्द्रियाणि मनो नहि
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
tathā bhrāntairdvidhā prokto hyātmā jīveśvarātmanā | nāhaṃ deho na ca prāṇo nendriyāṇi mano nahi
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
तथा भ्रान्तैः द्विधा प्रोक्तःtathā bhrāntaiḥ dvidhā proktaḥthus, by the deluded, twofold is called
हि आत्मा जीव-ईश्वर-आत्मनाhi ātmā jīva-īśvara-ātmanāthe self indeed — as the living and the Lord
न अहं देहःna ahaṃ dehaḥnot I the body
न च प्राणःna ca prāṇaḥand not breath
न इन्द्रियाणि मनः न हिna indriyāṇi manaḥ na hinot the senses, not the mind, indeed
अनुवाद
"…thus, by the deluded, the self is called twofold — as the living being and as the Lord. Not I the body, and not breath, not the senses, not the mind."
संस्करण
268f3d847d10 · प्रकाशित 12 अग॰ 2026, 5:00:00 am UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
It is stated directly: the distinction between jiva and ishvara — the living being and the Lord — is the work of bhrantayah, "the deluded." This is precisely the point where the two sides diverge finally; and it deserves the fullest examination, for everything is settled here. The Vaishnava answer rests not on sentiment, but on these very books, and cites them in three forms.
The first — the image of the two birds, discussed when reading the sixth khanda (6.17). The Mundaka: one eats, the other looks on without eating (3.1.1); and the next verse says the grieving one is freed upon seeing the other (3.1.2). The word anyam, "the other," stands there directly.
The second — the Shvetashvatara, which says of the same two: "two unborn — the knowing and the not-knowing, the lord and the not-lord" — jnajnau dvav ajav ishanishau (1.9). The distinction is drawn in one half-verse, and moreover with an indication of how they differ: one knows and possesses, the other does not. The third — the Gita, where Krishna says: "never was there a time when I was not, or you, or these rulers of men; nor shall there be a time when we shall cease to be hereafter" (2.12). Three are listed, and the eternity of each is asserted separately.
Let us add an argument from this book itself, which seems to me the strongest of all. The book is a conversation: Dattatreya answers Sankriti. If the distinction between questioner and answerer is a delusion, then the whole book is a record of delusion; and the teacher, instructing the pupil, is occupied with something that does not exist.
One could object that the teaching is given at a lower level; but then this very assertion about delusion is stated at that same level too — for it too is spoken by a teacher to a pupil.