उपनिषद् · Kaṭha 2.19
॥
देवनागरी
हन्ता चेन् मन्यते हन्तुं हतश् चेन् मन्यते हतम् ।
उभौ तौ न विजानीतो नायं हन्ति न हन्यते
लिप्यंतरण (IAST)
hantā cen manyate hantuṃ hataś cen manyate hatam /
ubhau tau na vijānīto nāyaṃ hanti na hanyate
शब्दशः अर्थ
संस्कृतIASTअर्थ
हन्ताhantāthe slayer (from √han); the killer; the striker
चेत्cetif; should
मन्यतेmanyatethinks; supposes
हन्तुम्hantumto kill; to destroy
हतःhataḥthe slain; the one thought to be slain
चेत्cetif; should
मन्यतेmanyatethinks; supposes
हतम्hatamas slain; as struck down; as put to death
उभौubhauboth; the two
तौtauthey; those two
नnanot; no
विजानीतःvijānītaḥthey discern (dual of vi-√jñā — 'to know by distinguishing'); they comprehend; they understand rightly
नnanot; no
अयम्ayamthis; the Ātman
हन्तिhantislays; strikes down
नnanot; no
हन्यतेhanyateis killed; perishes
अनुवाद
If the slayer thinks that he slays, and the slain thinks himself slain, both of them do not discern: this [Ātman] neither slays nor can be slain.
संस्करण
6fd296569afe · प्रकाशित 26 जुल॰ 2026, 9:13:03 pm UTC
उपलब्ध भाषाएँRUENश्लोक बदलें इन कुंजियों से
The continuation of the formula of immortality — the removal of the last illusion about death, seen from both its sides. hantā cen manyate hantum — "if the killer thinks: I kill"; hataś cen manyate hatam — "and the killed thinks: I am killed": ubhau tau na vijānītaḥ — "both of them do not discern". Both are deceived by one error — the identification of the being with the body; a killing is real as a crime against a body and a sin against the order, but metaphysically the soul cannot be "killed": nāyaṁ hanti na hanyate — "this one neither slays nor is slain".
The verse must be read strictly in pair with the preceding: the 47th said what the soul is (unborn, eternal), the 48th what cannot happen to it. The Gītā (2.19) cites it verbatim — and immediately (2.21 and following) blocks the false inference: the knowledge of the soul's unkillability is no licence for violence but a freedom from horror and hatred; it calls Arjuna not to cruelty but to the discharge of duty without despair.
For Naciketas it is the direct settlement of his question about the "great passage": in death no one vanishes — what happens happens to the garment, not to the wearer. For one who has discerned this (vijānītaḥ — that very vi-√jñā, "to know by distinguishing"), both killing and dying have moved out of the category of absolute catastrophes into that of events in the world of forms — grievous, but not final.