Upanishads · Jābāladarśana 4.63
॥
Devanāgarī
विभेदजनके ज्ञाने नष्टे ज्ञानबलान्मुने । आत्मनो ब्रह्मणो भेदमसन्तं किं करिष्यति
Transliteration (IAST)
vibhedajanake jñāne naṣṭe jñānabalānmune | ātmano brahmaṇo bhedamasantaṃ kiṃ kariṣyati
Word-by-word
SanskritIASTMeaning
विभेद-जनके ज्ञानेvibheda-janake jñānewhen the knowledge that produces difference
नष्टे ज्ञान-बलात् मुनेnaṣṭe jñāna-balāt munehas perished by the power of knowledge, O sage
आत्मनः ब्रह्मणः भेदम्ātmanaḥ brahmaṇaḥ bhedamthe difference between self and brahman
अ-सन्तं किं करिष्यतिa-santaṃ kiṃ kariṣyatibeing non-existent, what will it accomplish?
Translation
"When, by the power of knowledge, the knowledge that produces difference has perished, O sage, — the difference between self and brahman, being non-existent, what will it accomplish?"
Version
2b8a900a244a · published Aug 7, 2026, 8:28:46 AM UTC
Available inRUENPage between verses with
The khanda ends with a verse that is, in substance, the exposition of nondualist doctrine in a single sentence; and it must be examined with full honesty. It says: difference is asat, "non-existent"; it is produced by knowledge, and with the destruction of that knowledge, it too vanishes. The construction is elegant. Let us first say wherein its strength lies.
Its strength is that it explains why difference seems so certain: and it must seem so, as long as the knowledge that produces it is active. The objection "but I see the difference" is thereby disarmed in advance. Now let us state the objection the Vaishnava side raises, and which is examined in its books more thoroughly than any other. It is called ashraya-anupapatti, "the untenability of the locus," and consists in the question: whose is this ignorance?
The question is simple, and, as it turns out, there is not a single answer. If the ignorance belongs to brahman — then brahman is not solid consciousness, for he too fails to know; and this contradicts the definition. If it belongs to the soul — but the soul, by this teaching, is itself brahman; so we are back to the first case.
If it is a third thing, neither the one nor the other — then non-duality is gone; there are now two. This objection was raised by Ramanuja at the beginning of his commentary on the Vedanta-sutra, where it stands first among seven; and in nine centuries no answer has been found that both sides accept as satisfactory. Let us add a second, simpler point. The verse says difference is destroyed jnana-balat, "by the power of knowledge." But knowledge belongs to someone; and at the very instant difference vanishes, the knower vanishes too, and so there is no one left to know that difference has vanished.
And a third, the simplest of all. If the matter ended with this verse, the book would end here. But it continues for six more khandas and teaches breath, the withdrawal of the senses, concentration, and contemplation — that is, it does not itself consider what has been said the final word.