Upaniṣads · Tripurātāpinī 108
॥
Devanāgarī
घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा । घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तथा जीवो नभोपमः ॥ 13॥ घटवद्विविधाकारं भिद्यमां पुनः पुनः । तद्भेदे च न जानाति स जानाति च नित्यशः ॥ 14॥ शब्दमायावृतो यावत्तावत्तिष्ठति पुष्कले
Transliteración (IAST)
ghaṭasaṃvṛtamākāśaṃ nīyamāne ghaṭe yathā | ghaṭo nīyeta nākāśaṃ tathā jīvo nabhopamaḥ || 13|| ghaṭavadvividhākāraṃ bhidyamāṃ punaḥ punaḥ | tadbhede ca na jānāti sa jānāti ca nityaśaḥ || 14|| śabdamāyāvṛto yāvattāvattiṣṭhati puṣkale
Palabra por palabra
SánscritoIASTSignificado
घट-संवृतम् आकाशंghaṭa-saṃvṛtam ākāśaṃspace, enclosed by a pot
नीयमाने घटे यथाnīyamāne ghaṭe yathāas, when the pot is carried
घटः नीयेत न आकाशंghaṭaḥ nīyeta na ākāśaṃthe pot is carried, not the space
तथा जीवः नभः-उपमःtathā jīvaḥ nabhaḥ-upamaḥso the jīva, like the sky
सः जानाति च नित्यशःsaḥ jānāti ca nityaśaḥand it knows always
Traducción
«As space, enclosed by a pot: when the pot is carried, the pot is carried, not the space, — so the jīva, like the sky. As the pot, manifold in appearance, broken again and again, — and in that division it does not know, and it knows always».
Versión
f9a4676238a3 · publicado 7 ago 2026, 5:19:24 UTC
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A second famous likeness is cited — ghaṭa-ākāśa, «space in a pot». Space is one; pots divide it into appearances; break the pot, and the «inner» space turns out to be the same as the outer. This likeness has been examined more than any other in disputes, and there are two objections to it.
The first. Space knows nothing and suffers nothing; it is indifferent to whether the pot stands or is broken. But the soul knows; and the verse itself admits this in its last line: sa jānāti ca nityaśaḥ, «and it knows always». Knowledge is a property, and a property is a distinction; and the likeness with space falls apart at this point, for space has no properties.
The second, and more important. Are the pots real, or not? If real — then there is something besides the one, and the teaching of oneness is not upheld. If unreal — then there is nothing by which to explain why «space» appears divided at all; and appealing to ignorance does not help, for one must still say whose ignorance this is. If it is Brahman's, then Brahman is not omniscient; if it is the jīva's, then the jīva exists prior to its own ignorance, and it is something.
This difficulty is old, and the schools have answered it in many ways, none of which has satisfied the other side. The Vaishnava explanation does without it: souls are not parts of the one, partitioned by vessels, but have always been many — eternally distinct and eternally not-separate, like sparks from a fire and rays from the sun. Then there is no need to explain where the partition came from, for there never was one.